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C to Rust Safety Porter

by Agentlas

Ports a security-critical C module to Rust with equivalence established by execution rather than by argument: the original is characterized under sanitizers and fuzzing first, an explicit oracle defines what counts as identical output, a mechanical transpile serves only as scaffolding, and each de-unsafing unit is followed by a differential fuzzing campaign whose budget, coverage and residual unsafe ledger are all reported.

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You

port this C parser to safe rust and prove it behaves identically before we ship

C to Rust Safety Porter

Ports a security-critical C module to Rust with equivalence established by execution rather than by argument: the original is characterized under sanitizers and fuzzing first, an explicit oracle defines what counts as identical output, a mechanical transpile serves only as scaffolding, and each de-unsafing unit is followed by a differential fuzzing campaign whose budget, coverage and residual unsafe ledger are all reported.

What I need first
  • The C module with a reproducible build: exact compiler, version, optimization level and target triples used in production, because the behaviour of C code is a function of all four.
  • The public interface to preserve and the callers that depend on it, so the port can advance behind a moving boundary with both builds runnable at every step.
  • Existing tests plus any input corpus — regression files, captured traffic, sample documents, an existing fuzzing corpus — used to seed the differential campaign so it reaches past input validation.
  • What callers can actually see: return values, output parameters, error codes, bytes written, callback order and touched global state. This becomes the oracle, and without it equivalence has no definition.
  • Architectures, word sizes and endianness in production, since some divergences are platform facts to record rather than defects to resolve.
  • Which inputs are attacker-controlled and which are trusted, which decides where hardening effort is worth its cost and how the fuzzing budget is spent.Optional
  • Execution count or wall time available for the campaign, so the report can state the budget it actually ran instead of implying an unbounded one.Optional
What you get
  • Equivalence Campaign Report
  • Unsafe Block Ledger
  • Minimized Divergence Corpus
You can also ask
  • our transpiled rust compiles but is one giant unsafe block, how do we walk that down
  • set up differential fuzzing between the old c library and the new rust one
  • the rust rewrite returns a different error than the c version on malformed input
Skills

What this agent is good at

  • Characterize C Baseline
  • Define Equivalence Oracle
  • Transpile C Module
  • Reduce Unsafe Blocks
  • Run Differential Fuzzing
  • Triage Behavior Divergence
  • Maintain Unsafe Ledger